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I. — INTRODUCTION
The discipline of industrial economics got new impetus in the 1970s, when
economies around the world experienced a deep crisis, with inflation, social
conflicts and for firms, rising costs and new production systems. The Revue
d’Économie Industrielle was founded in these years. L’Industria was created
in 1886 but was renewed as a journal of industrial economics and policy in the
1970s when Romano Prodi took its direction (see Bianchi et al. in this issue).
The crisis therefore had deep structural implications for industry which scho-
lars found necessary to examine.
At the 30th anniversary of the Revue d’Économie industrielle a new crisis is
having important consequences on industry and is turning attention back to the
role the State in the economy. Globalisation primarily meaning increasing
competition from new important players that are emerging countries and the
boom of the financial sphere of the economy no longer closely related to the
productive sphere, all raise important issues for industries.
However, the important structural problems firms are facing have earlier
roots than the crisis. In fact, they spurred a debate on the role of industrial poli-
cy in industrial development. Discussions around this debate showed that the
dominant approach to industrial policy was made of different types of inter-
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vention all decided and implemented separately in practice : antitrust, research
and innovation policy, regulation, and so on. The limits of such approach were
discussed and it was concluded that whereas industrial policy is indeed made
of various types of instruments its coherence must be guaranteed at political
level by providing a programme, a vision of industrial development.
In the EU, such vision can be claimed to be the Lisbon Strategy. Many eco-
nomists have argued that this Strategy is a failure, in terms of objectives’ ambi-
tion and incoherence. However, as a strategy for long-term industrial develop-
ment it can be considered as a success : it embarks all EU members towards
the same aims, in a process that makes increasingly clear, as the implementa-
tion of the Strategy carries on, that coordination has to be deepened to more
than the simple sharing of informations and experiences.
The paper is organised as follows. We analyse industrial policies before the
crisis in section 2, outlining how they gained increasing momentum in the
early years of the new century. Section 3 provides an analysis of the crisis,
while sections 4, 5, and 6 analyse its major implications on industrial policy :
sections 4 and 5 respectively analyse the case of the USA and of the EU, while
section 6 addresses a core problem of the crisis, namely the increasing gap bet-
ween the productive and the financial spheres of the economy. Section 7
concludes.
II. — INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
2.1. The « return » of industrial policies
The role of the State in the economy has always interested economists, but
until recently the debate about the role of the State was reduced to an opposi-
tion between interventionists and liberals. The liberal doctrine was widely
rejected immediately after WW2, partly because of its failures in the period
preceding the war, in favour of interventionism. States all around the world
therefore massively intervened in the economy, and implemented active and
selective industrial policies, the State often becoming producer, in order to
reconstruct industrial systems and economies. From the late-1970s and 1980s
such interventionism was increasingly criticised because of some inefficien-
cies created (for instance, State-owned firms tending to be inefficient) and of
capture of politicians by some industrial lobbies. A wave of liberal approach
therefore started, whereby economic agents, wherever they work, are viewed
as self-interested and only appropriate incentives defined in contracts can align
their interests with those of the whole society. The 2008 crisis, together with
its premises of the 1990s, namely the crises localised in specific regions of the
world (Latin America, Asia) in turn reveal the excesses of the liberal approa-
ch and may constitute the start of a new approach. A return to interventionism
is impossible, because of its excesses and its protectionist tendencies. Rather a
sort of « pragmatist » approach seems to be emerging, whereby all actions are
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considered beyond ideology, provided they can be efficient and effective. The
pragmatist approach appears therefore to locate in between the two extremes
of interventionism and liberalism.
However, this evolution of industrial policy has not started with the crisis,
but much before it, in the end of the 1990s and early years of the new century
(Bianchi and Labory, 2006a). Industrial policy has experienced all the above
phases corresponding to the dominant view of the State in the economy: inter-
ventionism after WW2 and up to the 1980s, liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s,
and what could be called a pragmatic approach since 2000 (see Bianchi et al.
in this issue).
This is due to the requirements of the new competitive context emerging
from the globalisation process. Bianchi and Labory (2006a) show that the new
competitive context represented by the diffusion of the knowledge-based eco-
nomy coupled with the growing importance of competitors such as China and
India indeed imply the need to define new industrial policies : competition
increases for all products (for example, China had already become the third
world exporter, trade between China and the EU doubled between 2000 and
2005) so that developed countries have to extend their relative comparative
advantages, in high quality market segments and in high tech sectors. The
competition from emerging countries is not limited to lower market segments
and lower technology content : China and India train each year more scientists
and engineers than European countries and the USA and are developing com-
petitive advantages in high tech sectors. India has relatively strong electronics,
IT, pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors. This trend is so strong that even
the world leader in research and innovation, namely the USA, is loosing
ground relative to emerging countries, especially Asian ones, in terms of scien-
tific publications and patenting activity (NSF, 2009). The research effort has to
increase and the market failures in the market for ideas justifies government
intervention, through R&D subsidies, protection of intellectual property rights,
inducement of cooperation between the various actors of the innovation sys-
tem.
2.2. Defining the new industrial policies
Defining industrial policy is not easy primarily because defining industry is
no longer straightforward. Issues are different if industry is reduced to manu-
facturing or if industry is defined as all productive sectors. Given the impor-
tant changes that have occurred in industries in the last thirty years, the gro-
wing importance of services and the increasing bundling of services and
goods, many phases of the productive process being outsourced and becoming
services, we prefer adopting the definition of Adam Smith, according to which
industry comprises all productive sector and represents the capacity to organi-
se production. Industrial policy is then a variety of public actions aimed at
orientating and controlling an economy’s structural transformation process.
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The analysis of production processes is the focus of analysis from this pers-
pective.
Production organisation is not given, but often changes due to structural
changes in the economy. Such changes are both exogenous and endogenous.
Exogenous changes include the emergence of a new technology, the competi-
tion from new competitors, the start of an economic integration process bet-
ween countries. Endogenous changes include technological progress and lear-
ning, leading to the development of new competencies hence increase in
human capital and knowledge. These factors for change imply that the econo-
my is in constant evolution and imply the need for industrial policies that could
accompany transformations. The main reasons why firms may incur in diffi-
culties are the following :
1. change is too frequent and too broad (for instance, Japanese producers
with new production processes in the 1980s) ;
2. change is difficult due to the lack of adequate skills in labour markets ;
3. social capital is inadequate : the local community is reluctant to changes
or too close ;
4. infrastructure is lacking (lengthy and costly administrative procedures that
create delay in adaptation) ;
5. capital markets are inefficient such that firms have difficulties accessing
to financial resources.
Industrial policies must aim at resolving the different problems, by develo-
ping infrastructure, support training of human capital or access to finance.
The need to adapt is larger when production processes experiences deep
changes. This is precisely what happened in the 1990s with the diffusion of
information and communication technologies, the emergence of new rivals
with the end of the world political bipolarism, both translating into production
processes increasingly intensive in intangible assets. These pressures for
changes grew and became very important and diffuse in the late-90s and at the
beginning of the new century.
As shown previously, industrial policy is a broad concept encompassing
many measures and action fields. It is therefore difficult to analyse industrial
policy in general, and scholars prefer focusing on one or another of its ele-
ments : technology policy, competition policy, and so on. The drawback is that
there is a lack of broad view and a lack of consideration of the interactions bet-
ween the policies ; policy evaluation is also lacking as a result. The advantage
is that causes and effects can more easily be identified : models are simpler,
with clearer conclusions and indicators defined.
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Our definition relates to the definition provided by Geroski (1989), who
argued that industrial policy is motivated by two major elements : first, the cor-
rection of market failures ; second, the orientation of a country’s set of specia-
lisations, accompanying restructuring of declining industries and promoting
the development of new industries, especially high tech. The second aspect is
dynamic in nature and it is what our definition focuses on.
2.3. Industrial policy in the new century
As shown in the Handbook of industrial policy (Bianchi and Labory, 2006b),
industrial policy has, since 1990, essentially focused on competition policy,
regulation and technological and innovation policy. Regarding the different
levels of implementation, a large focus has been put on local and regional poli-
cies, in so-called bottom-up approaches.
The knowledge-based economy or economy where intangible assets take
increasing importance has raised new policy issues in essentially two fields.
First, competition policy applied to new sectors incur into the problem of the
diffusion of networks. While in the past R&D was mainly conducted within
the labs of large firms, now research and innovation occurs through the inter-
actions of firms with universities and other research centres, other firms, and
so on. The problem is that innovation is a highly uncertain and risky activity
and hence it is very difficult to assess whether a research alliance will lead to
anti-competitive practices (Lorentzen and Mollgaard, 2006). This creates legal
uncertainty in the implementation of antitrust law. Second, technological and
innovation policy has been concerned with both intellectual property right pro-
tection and clusters, or networking and establishing systems of innovation.
Property rights to protect new knowledge, and networking to increase com-
munication and relations implying higher probability of innovation.
In fact, policies have been aimed at increasing intangible assets in the eco-
nomy: creation of new knowledge (innovation) to increase the knowledge base
and development of adequate skills (human capital). Production processes
indeed deeply change and require more intangible assets (De Bandt, 2006).
Intangible assets are generated by combining different assets, both tangible
and intangible. For instance innovation arises by combining physical assets
(labs, instruments, energy to run labs) and intangible assets (human capital,
knowledge base and organisational capital, meaning the capacity to organise
teams of researchers so that they are motivated and communicate well with
each other). The complementarity between assets is thus fundamental in order
to create intangible assets, so that networking is key in order to create these
complementarities. Hence new production processes are organised as net-
works, often globally based, with nodes, such as research facilities, in different
countries.
Industrial policy cannot act on global value chains. It can act locally, favou-
ring synergies and complementarities that can be inserted in global value
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chains. Here again, network is a keyword since the firm organises as a network
that coordinates a chain of suppliers, not necessarily located in the same coun-
try.
The new industrial policy is characterised therefore by two aspects. First,
market forces and private initiative are considered as the driving force of
industrial development. Second, governments have a strategic and coordina-
ting role to play in the productive sphere beyond simply ensuring property
rights, contract enforcement and macroeconomic stability.
Structural change is the essence of economic and industrial development.
According to Rodrik (2008), markets do not provide enough incentives to push
for these changes. These are market failures that prevent structural adjustment.
However, networking in order to realise synergies is also fundamental in
industrial development, hence the objective of industrial policy to favour the
creation of systems, that we could call systems of development. There are in
this perspective systemic failures that policy also has to address (see von
Tunzelman in this issue).
Interestingly, the Handbook of Industrial Policy examines different types of
industrial policy but never questions the necessity of industrial policy.
Reviews of the state-of-the-art concerning different issues concern long time
period that comprises the liberal years of mainly the 1990s, showing it is full
of policy intervention. Industrial policy therefore has always been and conti-
nue to be implemented around the world, despite the official discourse that
rejected it until recently (see for instance US industrial policy in section 4).
The Handbook shows that the number of questions, fields and instruments of
industrial policy is varied and complex, from antitrust, to regulation, intellec-
tual property rights and clusters, regional industrial development and develop-
ment of broader spaces. The problem is that given that industrial policy could
not be mentioned nor studied until recently, no broad view of industrial policy
has been developed. A broad view is necessary not only to orientate the various
fields and measures towards specific objectives, such as the development of
new sectors, but also in order to address the problem of coherence of industrial
policy. Without the broad vision that considers the interaction between various
instruments, such as antitrust law, policy to promote cluster creation, support
to research activities, but also labour market policy influencing market flexi-
bility and macro policy, industrial development policies are likely to be inco-
herent. Coherence not only regards the various instruments, but also the diffe-
rent levels of implementation, namely regional, national and supra national.
This broad vision was the point of view of classical economists. Industrial
development was seen as a determinant of economic development that in turn
determined social and cultural development. The social impacts of some indus-
trial characteristics, such as the division of labour, were also very closely exa-
mined in order to determine their sustainability and the possible role of policy,
hence the State, in correcting possible negative effects.
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Before proceeding further in this analysis, what has been the impact of the
crisis on the emergence of this new approach to industrial policy? In order to
examine this point, we first analyse the reasons for the crisis and then move on
to its impact.
III. — CRISIS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FROM 1945 TO 2009
After the long global conflict that covers the first half of the 20th century and
that is made of different elements, including the end of colonial empires, the
economic crisis of the 1930s, the authoritarian regimes in Europe and the
Second World War, the world ends up strongly and neatly divided into two and
supported by a very delicate equilibrium that opposes two coherent systems
and excludes a third one, called the Third World, characterised by under deve-
lopment and chronic poverty.
The Western world comprises the USA, Canada, Western Europe, Japan,
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The Eastern world is centred around
the USSR and its satellites, with difficult relationships with China. The fron-
tier between the two worlds has been sometimes torn or kept with suffering, as
shown by the Vietnam War or the construction of the Berlin Wall.
The explosion of the Soviet Union and the transition of many communist
countries to market economies has put an end to that political system under-
lying the economy, opening the way to globalisation. Globalisation can be
represented by a game in which all players play against each others, including
new important players such as China, India, Brazil and the new Russia, so
much so that it has become necessary to establish new rules for the game.
The old rules of the game were established during the Second World War, at
Bretton Woods. After the disasters caused by the bad rules established after the
first World War, European countries had learned and had new ideas in mind.
Keynes, although very young at that time, had criticised the rules established
in the end of the First World War and had realised a deep reflection, in his
books The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), Tract on Monetary
Reform (1923), and numerous articles some of which published in Essays in
Persuasion (1931). These thoughts led him to argue that after a very strong dis-
continuity such as a war economy, it is not useful to try and go back to the
situation existing prior to it, but rather it is preferable to concentrate on sustai-
ning the recovery of the economy on the basis of the new conditions. In 1936
Keynes published The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
and in 1940, How to pay for the War. In that later small tract, he proposed com-
pulsory savings and rationing in order to prevent inflation during the war. He
was at Treasury during the war and after thinking about measures to accom-
pany the war economy, he focused on economic measures for the post-war era.
Thus he formulated his proposal for « bancor », an international clearing
308 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
union, in 1943. He led the British delegation at the international conference of
Bretton Woods in 1944 but his proposal was rejected in favour of the US ones,
preferring to peg currencies against the dollar and the dollar against gold.
Keynes stressed the importance both of an active role of the State in order to
sustain investments but also of an international opening, regulated by interna-
tional institutions that could manage the transformation of economies.
This illuminated view however was not accepted at Bretton Woods where
the American economy imposed itself as central in the new world order, since
its currency became the basis of the international monetary system. Keynes
had highlighted the risks of such a system and had proposed the bancor as a
composite currency comprising the different national currencies, that would
support an international monetary system based on the stability of various eco-
nomies rather than just one.
The strength of the American economy was supported by a complex public
action which had at its core the military industrial complex. The strong public
spending on defence contributed to domestic demand, but the largest contri-
bution stemmed from mass consumption and low imports. For many years this
system was consolidated by decreasing costs of both raw material and labour,
labour supply being fed by immigration, in a regime of fixed exchange rates
and capital costs.
European countries started to grow again in the mid-1950s, thanks to the
opening of the internal market within the trade union, the common external
tariff protecting European economies from US imports. This situation develo-
ped up to the economic boom of the early 1960s.
After the 1960s however the international economic system based on the
strong American economy started to show weaknesses, since the American
economy showed signs of difficulties, primarily linked to the Korean and
Vietnam war. In 1971, President Nixon declared the end of the convertibility
of dollar into gold.
A long crisis followed in the 1970s up to the 1990s, although with ups and
downs. The end of the fixed exchange rates regime, the deep rise in oil and raw
material prices, the endless workers conflicts, the hyperinflation that for years
accompanied economic stagnation show again, as pointed out by Keynes, the
necessity to identify adequate levels of governance of the world economy in
front of changes that affect the political organisation of the world economy.
In the 1980s and 1990s only Europe attempted an institutional innovation,
namely an economic and monetary union that has elevated collective action
beyond national borders.
On the other side of the Atlantic political unilateralism was relaunched,
taking the name of Washington Consensus, whereby the American economy
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remained the point of reference of the world order and pushed towards trade
opening without rules, rapid transformation of some countries, both in transi-
tion and emerging, towards the integration of the world economy.
The new economic phase was characterised by the collapse of communist
countries, where the centrally-planned economy did not manage to adapt to the
increasing complexity of the world economic context.
The lack of adjustment of the world economic system translated into various
crises, that Krugman identifies in his 2008 book The Return of Depression
Economics and the Crisis of 2008. He recalls the warning signals that the cri-
sis of several Latin American countries represents, the Japanese and then the
Asian crises, and the speculative waves that have characterised the world eco-
nomy over the last years of the 1990 decade. All constituting tremors that
signalled the arrival of a bigger earthquake, the financial crisis of 2008. The
« earthquake » is having devastating effects because the epicentre is no longer
at the margin of the world economy, but at his centre, the US economy,
although this country was, since the late 1990s, candidate to remain the core
of the new world order.
3.1. The dynamics of the crisis
World economic growth has experienced ups and downs since the 1980s, the
analysis of which helps to understand the roots of the crisis. Figure 1 shows
real GDP growth for the whole world, for advanced economies and emerging
and developing countries since 1980.
FIGURE 1 : Real GDP growth since 1980 (annual % change)
Source : IMF statistics (www.imf.org)
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From the mid-1980s there is a first economic cycle characterised by growth
up to 1988, followed by a reduction of real GDP up to the period 1992-1994.
A new cycle follows, of growth up to 2000 (apart from the 1997 crisis), follo-
wed by a sudden fall in 2001, and then the actual development phase up to the
current crisis.
The most striking point showed by the graph is the growing distance bet-
ween emerging countries that settle at growth levels that are well beyond that
of advanced countries. The later countries are most hit by the actual crisis
since they almost go back to the growth levels of the early-1980s. Thus world
growth is now entirely driven by the growth of emerging countries.
The growing tendency of emerging countries to drive world growth can be
dated back to about the early-90s. This corresponds to the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the end, from a political point of view, of bipolarism. This process by
which growth levels of emerging countries growingly diverge from that of
advanced countries, the former gaining higher levels than the later, accentuates
with the Twin Towers disaster on 11 September 2001.
Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers disaster many
changes occurred. The European Union deepened integration with the mone-
tary union and the adoption of a common currency between a core of member
countries. Notice that European countries thereby followed Keynes’ advice to
base their international monetary system on a composite currency. Stability
was thus based on the responsibility of all members. Much has been written on
the euro, some arguing that it would be too weak, although it revealed too
strong after its inception. In any case, during the crisis the single currency
revealed an element of stability and strength for European countries, although
the European Union is still adjusting to the most important enlargement of its
history, in terms of number of new members, after the entry of Central and
Eastern European countries.
Such enlargement has consolidated the growth of these transition countries,
not only attracting capital from abroad, but also acquiring productive activities
from Western Europe, thereby generating export economies that could restruc-
ture, allowing the extension of supply networks on the whole European conti-
nent.
The rapid growth of Eastern European countries gave impulse to the growth
of Western ones, so that benefits were shared among old and new members of
the Union.
Regarding other, and most important, emerging countries, growth was very
high during the whole period, especially in China.
In the end of the 1970s, modernisers led by Deng Xsiao Ping are governing
the country. The policy of Deng is characterised by opening to the world eco-
nomy, attracting capital first in the area of Shenzen between Canton and Hong
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Kong, then in the rest of the country, basing industrial development on low
cost production for the external market. This opening also induces democratic
opening demands from the Chinese people, that the regime however does not
sustain until the Tien An Men slaughter (4 June 1989), which makes clear that
the only way to support economic opening without a political one is via high
growth rates implying growing income for the population.
From then China has kept high growth rates determined by export growth
and internal demand growth, together with a competitive exchange rate. In the
same years all Asian countries, except for Japan, experience rapid growth,
except for the 1997 crisis that hits first and foremost Japan.
The Japanese economy had experienced an extraordinary development since
1945 based on exports and internal demand and, in the 1990s, while internal
demand growth slows down, exports are increasingly rivalled by producers of
other Asian countries. A stop-and-go policy is therefore implemented in order
to reduce inflation but also to support exports. A speculative bubble is created,
that shifts savings and investments towards activities with high short-term
returns, to the expense of productive investments.
The speculative bubble explodes showing that the stock market and housing
markets’ values did not have correspondence in the real economy, hence huge
losses for families and for the banking sector, followed by a fall in consump-
tion and in industrial investments and a growing public deficit. The govern-
ment intervenes with strong public spending in order to sustain the economy,
bringing government deficit to more than 10 % of GDP and debt to 100 %, in
addition to which a massive action is necessary to save the banking system.
The Japanese economy only recovers in 2003, thanks to world demand
growth and to the growing exports (of intermediary goods) to the Chinese eco-
nomy. However, the Japanese economy maintains weaknesses, with an ageing
population and mature industrial system.
This « Japanese disease » has been somewhat shared in other Asian countries
which rapid economic development induced the World Bank in the mid 1990s
to define them « the Far East miracle ». In 1997 the devaluation of the Thai
currency opens a phase of financial crisis that extends to the whole Asia.
Thailand is a small economy hence very open, so much so that its recession
rapidly extends to the other Asian countries.
In the other extreme of the world, Latin America was experiencing big
troubles too, again mainly due to the disparity between the financial and pro-
ductive spheres of the economy. Indeed, the search for short-term profits leads
the financial markets, if not regulated, to rapidly expand, attracting all savings,
to the expense of the productive sectors which have difficulties in investing
and to the government sector, which deficit tends to increase. Such disparity
grows up to the point where financial assets are too overvalued and the bubble
explodes.
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In the same manner, in many Latin American countries, after the so-called
Decada Perdida, that is, the period of dominance of dictatorship, strong infla-
tionary tendencies put the return to democracies into strains. Argentina and the
other countries peg their currency to the dollar, thereby implying a reduction
of inflation but also a drastic internal restructuring that induce the rapid exit of
the markets by the less competitive firms in a regime of trade opening and
overvalued currency. Here again the phenomenon of bubble in the financial
and housing markets that shifts resources away from the productive sectors
induces a new dramatic crisis in 2001.
In these years the only two countries that do not experience strong crisis are
China and India. India experienced a series of reforms during the 1990s that
allow the country to consolidate growth based on the development of a com-
petitive industrial sector also supported by investment in human capital.
Various crises take place in the world with a similar scenario, namely the
development of weak economies accelerated by the development of financial
and housing activities which however crowds out the sectors of the real eco-
nomy. To this one must add the rigidity of international institutions which only
believe in and apply the so-called Washington Consensus, namely a drastic
reduction in the role of the State, with reduction in interest rates, so that the
capacity of the government to intervene with monetary policy is reduced, toge-
ther with privatisation and liberalisation of financial markets as a factor for
trade opening and rapid integration of capital markets.
These localised events have been considered as only localised without
paying attention to their systematic nature across different parts of the world.
Until they also hit the American economy.
3.2. The problems of the American economy and the crisis
The signals of productive crisis in the United States are not recent at all.
Figure 2 shows the balance of payment statistics for the USA, China and
Japan. The evolution of the American economy appears to be mirroring the
Japanese economy in the 1980s, but from 1991 the American balance of pay-
ments worsens continuously and dramatically also relative to the Chinese
balance of payments. While the balance of payments was worsening, unem-
ployment reduced from 8 to 4 %, essentially due to the development of tertia-
ry activities that were seen as necessary for the American economy.
While new firms were created in new sectors, a new financial sector was also
developing, that was bringing these firms to very high capitalisation levels.
The housing market also expanded a lot, with capitalisation effects similar to
those of the financial sector. The financial innovations allowed a booming
market and high development of the tertiary sector, that however experienced
a first internal crisis in 2000. The 11 September tragedy hit the American eco-
nomy in crisis, with unemployment rate rapidly rising to above 6 %.
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The victory of Georges W. Bush in the 2000 elections against Al Gore was
also a victory of an industrial system over another one. Al Gore indeed repre-
sented the American industry linked to high technologies, that required a new
strategy, while Bush represented the « old » system, the military industrial
complex that had governed the American economy for years. Bush continued
the liberal policy of Reagan and Bush senior, of deregulation and strengthe-
ning the links between the military industrial complex and the federal govern-
ment.
After 2001 the American economy experienced a strong recovery thanks to
the boom in public military spending. Although the dollar was undervalued,
the balance of payments kept worsening because of the rising imports of
consumer goods from Asia. In such a situation characterised by low money
cost and boom of new financial instruments, the housing markets boomed even
more, incorporating the inflationary expectations of an increasingly indebted
economy, in both the public and the private sector.
This toxic mix allowed an expansion of the economy up to 2005 thanks
to the contemporary reductions in interest rates and continuous rise in
public debt. The federal public deficit reached, in October 2008,
$ 10,538,935,751,874, rising by 3.88 billion on average per day, correspon-
ding to a value of public debt of $ 34,555 per capita.
The recovery of the American economy was therefore based on the traditio-
nal public intervention in the defence sector, which however worsened public
debt without a corresponding development in the industrial sector which faced
FIGURE 2 : Current Account Balance (Billions of US dollars)
Source : IMF statistics (www.imf.org)
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international competition but saw financial resources dragged away, either to
the military sector or to the financial and the housing sectors.
Chinese imports were compensated by the purchase by Chinese authorities
of American public debt, thereby allowing a « dangerous liaison » between the
two economies.
After the start of the crisis that rapidly diffused worldwide, industrial inter-
est groups, using the State to their own interests, pushed Bush to favour the
monopolisation of the economy.
The result was a disaster and the American economy now needs to be
restructured, with a redefinition of the role of the State in order to base grow-
th on healthy grounds. Obama wins the election with a programme aimed at
both redefining the rules of the game between the State and the market, boos-
ting internal demand through a variety of actions and inducing a restructuring
of industry.
We now turn attention to industrial policy in the US (section 4) and in the
EU (section 5) in recent years to outline the major consequences of the crisis
on industry and industrial policy in section 6.
IV. — US INDUSTRIAL POLICY: A COHERENT FRAMEWORK
In the US, each President defines strategies for long-term competitiveness
and economic growth which, given our definition, can be considered as indus-
trial policy. President Bush defined the American Competitiveness
Initiative (2). President Obama has also defined and started to implement such
a strategy. The strategies (at least since Clinton) put research and development
and human capital as the main levers of the competitiveness of American busi-
nesses and especially of the development of new sectors, that bring new jobs,
opportunities for the restructuring of old business and economic leadership of
the country in key sectors.
For instance President Obama has committed $ 147,6 billion of the federal
2010 budget to R&D (OSTP, 2009, p. 1). Already the Omnibus Appropriations
Act (Public Law 111-8) and the American Recovery and Investments Act
(Public Law 111-5) increased the budget allocated to research and innovation
not only because of their potential contribution to the recovery of the econo-
my but also because of their long-term prospects regarding the development of
new sectors. The federal budget appears to have declined in real terms over the
period 2004 to 2008 (from about $ 62 billions in constant 2009 $ to 57 bil-
(2) Labory and Prodi (2010) show the coherence of President Bush’s industrial policy ;
President Obama has changed some of the priorities and efforts, but the legislative frame-
work is roughly the same, especially in terms of guaranteeing coherence.
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lions), while it has been significantly increased in 2009 (about $ 72 billions)
and 2010 (about $ 58.5 billions) (OSTP, 2009). The research and innovation
effort has four priorities : basic research, clean energy, health and security.
Clean energy is clearly a priority of the Obama administration given the adop-
tion of the Waxman-Markey Bill in June 2009, which is the American Clean
Energy and Security Act (ACES) primarily aiming at reducing greenhouse
gases emissions by developing new energy sources.
The public effort to R&D is high in the US, but the private effort is even
higher. The US industry indeed finances around two thirds of US total
R&D (3). About 10 % of this spending are subsidised by the federal govern-
ment (Wolfe, 2006, p. 5). The federal government mainly subsidizes large
firms : very small firms have federal subsidies for about 9.6 % of the R&D
spending, while very large firms have such subsidies for about 15 %. However,
States also support R&D and SMEs in particular. States innovation policy
seems to focus on the development of new sectors at the regional level (favou-
ring collaboration among firms, providing high skills, …). For instance Best
(2005) analyses the development of a new biomedical industry in the State of
Michigan, where the State had a role through innovation and human capital
policies (support to universities so that they could attract high quality students
even from other American States) but the most important appears to have been
the interactions between firms, local governments, research centres and other
important actors.
More importantly, the policy and legislative framework is supportive of the
coherence of industrial policy between the State and federal levels. Thus for
instance the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTTA) has been favouring,
since 1986 (Public Law 99-502), the transfer of technology developed by fede-
ral programmes into States’ activities. This act obliges researchers receiving
federal funding to actively transfer their innovative technologies to industries,
universities, State and local governments. The ways in which this transfer
occurs are specified in the law and are mainly technical assistance, licensing
of patents, cooperative R&D agreements and educational partnerships. The
FTTA also imposes preference for US based business that manufacture their
products on the American territory.
It can be argued to be one of the elements of the policy framework that
ensures coherence of US industrial policy not only between government levels
(State and federal) but also between instruments. Thus the USA have used a
number of instruments in order to guarantee the coherence of competition and
trade policy with their strong support of domestic industry. The three main ins-
truments can be argued to be specific provisions in trade policy ; government
procurement and the legal framework for intellectual property rights.
(3) In 2004, US companies in the manufacturing sector performed $ 147 Bn of R&D, repre-
senting 71 % of US total R&D (Wolfe, 2006).
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Regarding trade policy, the USA have pushed for free trade after the Second
World War, when its hegemony was uncontested. In the period from 1945 to today
the USA have always supported trade liberalisation in international negotiations,
but they always have taken measures to help industries damaged by free trade.
From the 1970s onward the hegemony started to be contested by Europe and
Japan, after their boom of the 1960s. The US therefore voted the Trade Acts of
1974 and 1979. The 1974 Act contains provisions against free trade. First, the
Section 201 regulates import relief in order to prevent or to remedy serious
injury to domestic producers resulting from increased imports associated with
tariff reduction. Individuals injured appeal to International Trade Commission.
Second, Section 301 is an unfair trade practices statute. It is designed to ensu-
re fair and equitable access of US products in foreign markets.
During the 1980s, under the Reagan administration policy turned to laissez-
faire, The US trade deficit increased considerably, so much so that the
Congress pushed for measures. As a result, Reagan took some unilateral pro-
tectionist measures. In addition, a new Trade Act was adopted by the Congress
in 1988, which President Reagan had to sign. This Act contained many indi-
rect restrictions to trade by singling out the countries with trade surpluses with
the US and enlarging the definition of « unfairness » of practices.
In more recent years, in the years 2000, it seems that the US have increasin-
gly used government procurement as an instrument for supporting national
champions (promoting exports and preventing imports). Thus Weiss and
Thurbon (2007, p. 703) argue that « even under the stricter trading regime of
the WTO, procurement offers arguably one of the few significant policy tools
remaining to governments, both central and regional, to foster domestic indus-
try without falling out of the multilateral rules ». The fact that most American
national champions such as Boeing, IBM, Lockheed, Caterpillar and Motorola
all have depended and still largely depend on government contracts to ensure
market shows that government procurement has been an important tool of
industrial policy in the US.
However, the US government sustains national champions not only by pro-
viding markets to domestic firms, but also by helping them obtaining procure-
ment contracts abroad. Thus Weiss and Thurbon (2007, p. 705) stress that « no
other State has been as globally active in driving open procurement markets ;
and no other State has been as nationally protectionist in legally mandating
“buying national” policies ». On the one hand, the US push for foreign procu-
rement markets to open, both in multilateral negotiations (Government
Procurement Agreement, GPA of 1988) and in bilateral negotiations (e.g. trade
agreement with Australia only under condition that Australia opens its procu-
rement market to US firms). On the other hand, the US protect their procure-
ment market by imposing buy national rules. Thus the « Buy American Act »
of 1933 requires federal and State agencies to give preference to domestically
produced goods and services. Many governments around the world have local
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preferences, but the US goes further by making Buy American a legal requi-
rement for its federal agencies (Weiss and Thurbon, 2007, p. 706).
In contrast, EU procurement directives are designed specifically to prevent
buy national policies, so that buy national policies are much more difficult to
implement than in the US. The US however grant foreign firms a « waiver »
from the Buy American legislation, but in reality EU reports on US trade bar-
riers claim that the implementation of waivers is shrouded by « legal uncer-
tainty ». (European Commission, 2007).
The legal framework governing property rights is also strongly complemen-
tary to technology policy and to other elements of industrial policy (Coriat,
2002). Since the Bayh-Dole-Act of 1980 and the subsequent laws encouraging
the patenting of inventions subsidised by the State, universities have encoura-
ged their researchers to patent their innovations. The apparent objective is to
encourage innovation, since patenting means getting the return from one’s
inventions. However, in the case of universities, which primary aim has always
been fundamental research in order to diffuse it openly to the rest of the eco-
nomy, thereby guaranteeing maximum spillovers, other aims might prevail.
In fact patent systems have been strengthened in all countries since the early
1980s. During the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the USA argued that the
violation of intellectual property rights could have as negative effects on inter-
national trade relationships as non tariff barriers. Hence the USA asked that the
commercial dimensions of the treatment of intellectual property be extended
within the GATT, while redefining their technological policy.
The US industrial protection rights have progressively become the new inter-
national norm. The new American doctrine of intellectual property protection
of living objects and software has diffused in the EU (Coriat, 2002). Other
countries, such as China, have changed their system following US pressures.
The diffusion of American norms worldwide is completed in the TRIPS agree-
ments, negotiated within the framework of the Uruguay Round and progressi-
vely implemented since 1995. TRIPS imposes all countries in the WTO to res-
pect minimum standards in terms of intellectual property rights.
In fact, the « Section 301 » of the 1984 Trade Act and the Bayh-Dole Act
imply both a widening of what can be patented and an extension of norms
regarding patents.
Therefore, coherence appears to be high in the US and is ensured primarily
by a strong, central (federal in this case) government that coordinates actions.
Measures to promote new industries are strong and different but complemen-
tary at the local (State) and federal level. Trade policy is also coherent with the
support of domestic industry through a number of provisions and exceptions
defined officially for reciprocity reasons. The legal framework is also comple-
mentary with industrial policy and all contribute to provide a context conduci-
ve to the competitiveness of the American industry.
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V. — INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE EU
While the USA were concerned about the competitiveness of their industry,
the European Union launched, in 2000, a complex strategy for industrial deve-
lopment that could revitalize the European economy in a context of starting
monetary union and enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries.
The context external to the EU was also important since the Doha agreements
were signed in the same year and saw the entry of China in the WTO. The
Lisbon strategy proposed a concerted action that involved all the policy lines
already experienced and constituted an important innovation in the decision-
making method of industrial development policies.
The Lisbon strategy is based on two pillars. The first pillar is market com-
petition which has to be fair, abuses of dominant position and possible biases
of state aids being avoided. The second pillar is the support to the competiti-
veness of European firms, through research and innovation policy and structu-
ral policy directed to less developed areas of the Union. Both pillars operate
on trans-national aggregative factors, with the promotion of networking bet-
ween firms and institutions ultimately aiming at creating an environment
favourable to industrial growth.
These multiple actions find coherence in the definition of an objective com-
mon to all the continent, namely the leadership in the knowledge economy.
The Lisbon strategy is therefore articulated into four main fields of actions :
1. more research, development and innovation ;
2. a more dynamic environment for firms ;
3. investing in people, through training ;
4. greening up the economy, that is, investing in technologies that could
allow industrial restructuring to be environmentally sustainable, starting from
an adequate energy policy.
The new European industrial policy thus essentially becomes a vision of the
future, towards which various policies implemented by policy-makers at all levels,
namely local, regional, national and European, could be coherently orientated.
The European Commission is assigned the role of coordination of national
policies and monitoring of the progress made towards the achievement of the
objectives. The European Commission subsequently has defined a new
approach to European policy-making, the so-called « Open coordination
method » : Member States are invited to exchange information on the measures
they have implemented so that best practices can be identified and adopted
elsewhere, thereby creating partnership between Member States, under the
monitoring of the European Commission.
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The Lisbon Strategy coordinates both a wide set of instruments and wide set
of implementation levels. The long-term vision of industrial development to
which all Member States adhere is defined at European level, not by the
Commission on its own but essentially on the basis of a dialogue between
Member States in European Councils. The long-term vision is then implemen-
ted by all policy decision-making levels in the Union, namely European, natio-
nal and local. The main level regarding competence is the national one (as defi-
ned in the Lisbon Treaty, in article 173), where each country adapts the strate-
gy to its own needs and conditions, and takes the necessary measures. At Union
level, the European Commission monitors progress towards the general objec-
tives and coordinate national efforts, inducing an exchange of information and
experiences between European countries. The European Commission also
coordinates efforts made at local level, inducing the sharing of experiences bet-
ween regions for instance (Interreg programme). The « open coordination
method » adopted by the European Commission is very important in ensuring
coherence at European level as well as leaving room for possible future more
important role of the EU in defining and implementing industrial policy.
This new approach is therefore the « natural » evolution of the Bangemann
approach, taking a more active role in the orientation of industrial specialisation
in the EU and in inducing structural change to follow specific paths. While in
the 1990s industrial policy was aimed at providing the conditions for industry to
embark on the best path, in the years 2000 public authorities at all levels also try
to identify the best path in order to orientate industrial development towards it.
The Lisbon Strategy therefore represents a new approach to industrial poli-
cy, in line with the spirit of the reform of the 1990s (defined in the Bangemann
report) and pursuing its development to accompany the new challenges of the
new century, namely the competition from emerging countries and the changes
internal to the European Union, with enlargement and the monetary union. The
strategy has been much debated, especially in the first years of its implemen-
tation, where it appeared as an incoherent set of objectives, the macro objec-
tives pushing towards reduction in budget deficit hence public spending while
the micro one tending to require more public spending (in research and infra-
structures). The European liberals also criticised the Strategy for its willin-
gness to govern the economy and the market.
This new industrial policy necessarily recalls an articulated vision of the eco-
nomy or, as Hirschman (1999) would argue, is a way of making the economy
more complex. This strategy indeed implies a complex and subsidiary vision
of the State, from the European Union to towns. The role of the European level
is to define a long term strategy, implement common programmes that create
European networks and regulate the competitive environment. The national
level defines and implements industrial policies aimed at supporting the parti-
cipation of individuals and firms in the competitive game, while the local and
regional levels operate a territorial programming necessary to development.
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The success of this new approach will depend on the capacity of Union
members to unify behind the common collective objective and eliminate natio-
nal tensions that, especially in a context of world crisis, tend to mistakenly see
in the national frontiers the natural area where problems can be best resolved.
The crisis should not be considered as tempest in which the best is to wait
for it to go through. Such a deep crisis must be considered as an exceptional
phase of reorganisation and relocation, relative to which a common vision to
revitalize and develop the economy is defined.
In Europe, coordinated action is no longer sufficient ; after the monetary
union, it is now necessary to create the instruments for a common government
of the economy, making steps towards political integration and therefore
towards the democratic legitimacy of a European leadership, starting from the
role of the European Parliament and the independence of the Commission rela-
tive to national governments.
The national state that was in the past the only reference for political action
is now always and inevitably, given the openness of the economy, involved in
a dialogue with other economies in a dynamic evolution that goes beyond
national borders. Some national States also have to face the request for major
autonomy from local communities. Hence it is now necessary to reflect on the
democratic essence of the State and on its articulation at all levels, from the
local to the supranational one. The role of international institutions must also
be rethought, given that they were created at the end of World War Two, that
is, in a context completely different from today’s.
In the changed context of today the lessons of classical economists are more
than ever useful. In particular, an economist such as Smith highlighted that the
Wealth of Nations is primarily determined by industrial production that is, the
capacity to organise specialisations and complementarities in knowledge and
competencies. Classical economists taught that industrial production is effi-
cient if it corresponds to a market where competition is the expression of the
right of all individuals to autonomously and independently participate to col-
lective action. The long term goals of autonomous and independent participa-
tion of all individuals in markets and industrial production, rather than the
short term goals of immediate profits are what drive the Wealth of nations.
In this context the new industrial policies imply a new design of the interna-
tional regulation system, including a redefinition of the role of international
institutions, but also the search for new development goals, that take into
account the problems that the global economy has to face, from environment,
to health, and to food security.
For this reason, thinking about industrial policy does not amount to thinking
about a battery of incentives and protectionist measures to save the national eco-
nomy, but rather to discuss the concept of market and the state in a global context.
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VI. — GLOBALISATION AND THE INCREASING GAP BETWEEN
THE FINANCIAL AND THE PRODUCTIVE ECONOMIC SPHERES
Perhaps the major direct impact of the crisis on industry is to reveal the pro-
blems raised by the increasing gap between the financial and the productive
sectors of the economy.
The globalisation phenomenon has particularly concerned financial markets,
in the sense that world financial flows have increased dramatically in the last
twenty years.
Thus trade on the global foreign exchange market is estimated at $3.21 tril-
lion per day, according to the Bank of International Settlements (78th annual
report, 2008). Between 2001 and 2007, foreign exchange turnover increased by
an average of 18 % per annum, to an average daily level of $ 3.5 trillion, which
is a bit less that Germany’s annual GDP. The ratio of the volume of transactions
on foreign exchange markets to world trade in goods and services was 2 to 1 in
1973, 10 to 1 in 1981, 50 to 1 in 1992 and 100 to 1 in 2006 (El Mouhoud and
Plihon, 2009), showing an increasing gap between the productive and the finan-
cial spheres of the economy, with a significant dominance of the latter.
According to El Mouhoud and Plihon (2009), world financial flows are
concentrated in the hands of a few States. Thus developing countries account
for about 80 % of world population, but only 30 % of global financial flows.
Among developing countries, emerging countries, including for a large part
China and India, account for about a half of all financial flows. The USA recei-
ve 60 % of world direct investments in order to finance the huge public defi-
cit outlined in the last section.
Besides States, multinational firms are important players in financial globa-
lisation, through mergers and acquisitions. The volume of mergers and acqui-
sitions in the world has represented $billion 85 in 1991, 558 in 1998 and 4500
in 2007 (according to Thomson Financial).
Financial investors are essentially institutional investors (pension, insurance
and mutual funds), private equity funds, hedge funds, exchange traded funds
and sovereign wealth funds. In 2008, such funds represented a total of $ 90 tril-
lion, down 17 % relative to the previous year essentially due to the financial
crisis. The breakdown of the various funds is shown in table (next page).
Investors, especially private equity and hedge funds, tend to push firms to
increase profits in the short term. These profits are not invested but distributed
to shareholders and to managers in the form of very high compensation
(Goldstein, 2009). Crotty (2003) estimates that well over half of the cash flow
of non financial corporations went to financial markets (interests, dividends,
etc.) in the period 1984 to 2000 (peaking at about 74 % in 1998) ; this percen-
tage was 30 % from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s.
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The very high compensation provided to managers in all firms but especial-
ly in financial firms has raised an important debate during this financial crisis.
Excessive compensation in the financial sector has been blamed for further
pushing actors to pursue short-term profits to the expense of long-term invest-
ments. The recent G20 Pittsburg Summit expressed that « excessive compen-
sation in the financial sector has both reflected and encouraged excessive risk
taking. Reforming compensation policies and practices is an essential part of
our effort to increase financial stability ».
Not only do these investors push firms to short-termism, but also they mean
that shareholding is no longer dispersed, as in the 1970s. The models of corpo-
rate governance showing the advantages of the separation of ownership and
control and the superiority of the model of capitalism based on firms listed on
stock exchanges rather than linked with banks or governments for corporate
control and financial resources relie on the dispersion of shareholding. This dis-
persion does no longer exist, and owners have strong influence over managers.
Countries where family ownership or State ownership do prevail, such as in
Italy, appeared to have suffered less during the crisis, at least in terms of public
spending to rescue financial organisations. In addition, in the end of the 1990s
and early 2000, excluding the exceptional period of financial crisis, the American
Treasury has spent six times more than the French State to rescue saving banks
and the Japanese State, twenty times more in order to save the large banks.
Hence the European model of capitalism, based on the predominantly fami-
ly and State ownership (Italy and France) or bank-firm relationships
(Germany) might have been beneficial during the crisis. In any case, the crisis
made it clear that the advantages and disadvantages of various forms of capi-
talism have to be re-examined in the current context.
The growing importance of intangible assets in the economy appears to contri-
bute to the boom in the financial sector. Globalisation and intensification of
TABLE : Global fund management industry
Type of fund Asset under management, $ trillion % total
Institutional investors 61.6 68.4
Sovereign wealth funds 3.9 4.3
Private equity 2,5 2.8
Exchange traded funds 0.9 1
Hedge funds 1.5 1.7
Private wealth 32.8 (1) 21.8
Total 90 100
(1) around a third of private wealth is incorporated into institutional funds
Source : IFSL (2009)
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world competition implie the need for firms to pursue non price strategies, whe-
reby products are more frequently renewed. In order to renew products more fre-
quently and launch new products the phases of the production process that are
prior to manufacturing (R&D) and after (commercialisation, marketing) take
primary importance. These phases of the production process are also those more
intensive in intangible assets (human capital of researchers and designers,
knowledge and innovation, etc.), implying, at the level of the firm and of sec-
tors, the growing importance of intangible assets (Bianchi and Labory, 2004).
Many studies have thus attempted to measure the relative importance of
intangible and tangible assets in economies. The OECD shows that intangible
assets account now for more than 50 % of total capital. At firm level, new
methods have been developed in order to better report on intangible assets.
(Zambon and Marzo, 2006)
Firms therefore find it important to report their intangible assets to investors.
The problem is that they are only imperfectly valued. Patents and other intel-
lectual property rights held by firms measure their knowledge base and their
innovative capacity, but they do not account for all the knowledge held by
firms. The capital provided by firms’ employees is not directly measured
either ; levels of education may constitute a proxy, but do not account for ins-
tance for lifelong learning and learning on the job. Not all intangible assets are
reported by firms. Consequently, the concept of goodwill has been defined and
is used in capital markets to assess firms’ intangible assets. Goodwill is the dif-
ference between the market value of the firm and the accounting value of the
firm, and is supposed to reflect a firm’s intangible assets. However, capital
markets are imperfect, sometimes subject to speculation and the value of the
firm derived by the market might be under or over estimated.
El Mouhoud and Plihon (2009) argue that the boom in financial markets is
due to the development of the knowledge-based economy. Knowledge is dif-
ficult to value for markets and the growing importance of knowledge has led
to the proliferation of patents in some sectors on the one hand, and the increa-
sing attention to short term profit by firms aiming at increasing their market
valuation and hence goodwill.
The growing importance of intangible assets is related to the knowledge-
based economy, since the common denominator of intangibles can be argued
to be knowledge (Bianchi and Labory, 2004). However, we do not think that
firms look for short-term profits only to increase the valuation of their assets.
The logic of the financial sphere is quite independent from firms and their pro-
duction needs. The financial investors mentioned above push the firms they
invest in to realise short term profits in order to allow them to earn greater
return on their investments. Besides this, investments in intangible assets are
intrinsically long term and it would be a contradiction for firm managers to
pursue short-term profits in order to raise their intangible capitalisation.
324 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
In any case, the growing importance of intangible assets raises new issues in
terms of firm reporting and asset valuation, that are being progressively, per-
haps too slowly, improved.
The extraordinary development of the financial sphere of the economy is to
a great extent independent of the developments of the productive sphere.
Agents in the financial sphere speculate and adopt strategies to maximise their
earnings, which can be enormous. As Sylos Labini argued (2006, p. 82, our
translation), « law creates the embankment through which the waters of the
economy flow; without such embankment the waters become a swamp and
can flood ». The liberal years have let the financial sphere develop without or
with very few limits leading to the financial crisis.
The difficulty of G20 governments to define new rules for global financial
flows also shows that it is very difficult to create embankment after a flood has
already occurs. As stressed by Dore (2008), financial institutions have a big
political power and resist re-regulation.
VII. — CONCLUSIONS
The crisis therefore reveals important structural problems of the economy, to
which firms in the non financial sector have to adapt. First, globalisation has
meant increasing worldwide competition in which firms invest in intangible
assets in order to increase to knowledge content of products. Second, there is
an increasing gap between the financial and the productive spheres, whereby
the financial sector takes an extraordinary dominance. As shown in the paper,
this has two major consequences on (non financial) industry : (a) short termism
of firms which pay more than half of their cash flow to financial markets, ins-
tead of investing it in long term investment projects ; (b) the superiority of the
model of firms listed on stock exchange over other forms of ownership such
as family or State ownership depended on shareholding being dispersed in the
hands of many small shareholders ; this is no longer the case, because share-
holding is now generally concentrated in the hands of a few funds, be they
equity, hedge or pension funds. In this condition the relative efficiency of the
different types of ownership structure must be examined again.
These are important issues that must be addressed, especially in terms of
policy implications.
Regarding industrial policy, our paper has shown that the issue raised by the
crisis is not whether a return to interventionism is necessary. Rather, the relevant
issue regards what form industrial policy must take in order to be effective.
Regarding the latter question, an important debate started before the crisis
(to which the International Handbook of Industrial Policy we edited in 2006
aimed at contributing) which unfortunately has tended to be put aside by the
crisis and the fear of return of protectionism. Of course, the crisis requires
exceptional measures, including massive State intervention to rescue banks
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and avoid the ruin of many small savers. This does not mean that the State is
here to stay with interventionism.
Rather, the evolution of industrial policy up to the crisis showed that it was
increasingly considered as a programme, a long-term vision of industrial deve-
lopment which ultimate aim is economic and social development (see also
Stiglitz on the wider goals of economic development).
Industrial development paths are indeed specific to countries and cannot be
repeated. Industrial development paths depend on the more or less recent history
of the territory, on the social structure, on economic organisation and on the
effective institutional governance of the country. The combination of these fac-
tors determines a historical situation that cannot be repeated, and must be addres-
sed by using instruments that may have been used in other contexts, but have to
be adapted to the local context. This is one of the reason why the universal reci-
pe of the Washington Consensus could not function. But similarly experiences
such as industrial districts or clusters cannot be implemented directly elsewhere.
Industrial policy in this perspective should propose a systemic approach to
development aimed at combining available resources with social objectives.
The aim of classics like Adam Smith when examining industrial development
was to support cultural and social development. Industrial development was
studied but as a mean to reach cultural and social development.
For this purpose a complex vision of development is necessary, where diffe-
rent actions combine in a long term perspective, where various agents can be
induced to follow an equilibrated and sustainable growth path. As stressed by
Hirschmann (1988), it is necessary to act in order to increase the complexity
of the economy, in the sense of allowing a higher number of individuals inter-
acting in it. Economic dynamics are thus rooted in social contexts, that beco-
me powerful if they manage to incorporate innovation elements without disag-
gregating. The mapping of social and institutional characteristics must aim at
identifying social structures that could be able to transform without loosing
identity, but rather by adapting this identity.
Industrial development results from the capacity of entrepreneurs to organi-
se production, to organise the division of labour, which tends no longer to be
organised in « filières » but rather in overlapping networks, where key
resources are no longer tangible assets but rather intangible assets such as
knowledge, human capital, social capital, the capacity to create knowledge.
Networks overlap both because products are bundled with other products or
services and because they are organised at different levels, namely local, regio-
nal, national and international levels.
This is precisely what emerges from the publications in the Revue d’Écono-
mie Industrielle. The new emerging forms of production organisation raise the
question of the necessity to re-examine the concept of productivity (for ins-
tance, special issues n° 118 and n° 120, 2007), and consequently, from a dyna-
mic perspective, that of industrial development and industrial policies.
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